A Dissection of Trading Capital: Trade in the Aftermath of the Fall of the Iron Curtain by Beestermöller, Matthias & Rauch, Ferdinand
358
A Dissection of Trading Capital:  
Trade in the Aftermath of the Fall  
of the Iron Curtain
Matthias BeesterMöller and Ferdinand rauch
We study trade in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and show that the 
countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy trade significantly more 
with one another after 1989 than predicted by a standard gravity model. Cultural 
trading capital, established under Habsburg rule and maintained in the period of 
the Iron Curtain, seems to have survived over four decades of separation and 
gives an initial boost to trade. This surplus trade disappeared rapidly after 1990 
as countries rearranged themselves with the new geopolitical circumstances. We 
document the rate of decay of these forces.
In 1989 the Iron Curtain fell quickly and unexpectedly, ending the sepa-ration between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. After 44 years of 
an almost completely sealed border, trade was suddenly free to reconnect. 
Despite the political and economic turmoil within the eastern regimes, 
trade between the West and East almost doubled within five years after 
1990. By the year 2000 it had almost tripled. We study this trade in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We pay special attention to 
Austria, a country that has engaged in trading opportunities beyond what 
would be expected given its size and geographic location, and might have 
been expected to be the main western beneficiary of Europe’s economic 
expansion eastwards. 
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In a standard gravity equation setting, we document that Austria 
indeed trades more with countries east of the Iron Curtain after 1990 than 
gravity would predict. However, we find that this effect is found only 
with the members of the former Habsburg Empire.1 It declines linearly 
and monotonically, and, in our preferred specification, becomes statisti-
cally insignificant after a decade while the predicted magnitude becomes 
zero after two decades. This trade surplus is not visible for trade relation-
ships between Austria and the other countries east of the Iron Curtain 
once we additionally control for the Habsburg effect. The magnitude of 
the Habsburg surplus trade in 1990 is very large, about four times the 
effect of a monetary union. We find no similar surplus trade for other 
western countries with the East. 
We argue that these results can best be explained by assuming a dete-
rioration of specific components of “trading capital” built up during the 
Habsburg years and maintained throughout the Cold War period. The 44 
years of Iron Curtain division severed all formal and business relation-
ships, almost all trade between the East and West, and made personal 
contacts difficult. However, historical legacies and cultural linkages 
persisted, facilitated by some low level economic ties during the Cold 
War. The decline of this surplus after 1990 reflects the continued disso-
lution of trading capital and the build-up of trading capital with other 
countries in Western Europe.
The term “trading capital” is introduced by Keith Head, Thierry Mayer, 
and John Ries (2010, hereafter HMR) who show that after independence 
former colonies continue to trade for a long period with their colonizers, 
but at a declining rate. They suggest that this observation might point 
to the presence of trading capital that is built up during colonization, 
and deteriorates after independence. Trading capital consists of various 
components that we can divide into three broad categories that facili-
tate trade: (1) physical capital, such as roads, railway lines, or pipelines 
that connect countries and directly facilitate trade through reduced bilat-
eral trade costs; (2) capital relating to personal communication, direct 
human interaction and contacts, or trust built up in repeated games, 
such as provided in structures of multi-national firms, joint ventures, or 
by frequent personal contacts and trust won through repeated interac-
tion; and (3) all other variables that facilitate trade, that are not based on 
personal interaction and formal or physical structures. These last include 
1 Throughout this article we use the terms “Habsburg Empire,” “Empire,” “Habsburg Empire,” 
and “Austro-Hungarian Monarchy” interchangeably, knowing that Austro-Hungary is only valid 
since 1867. We usually refer to the Empire in its extension shortly before WWI, as displayed in 
Figure 1.
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all notions of cultural familiarity, such as those facilitated by cultural 
norms, language, history, consumers’ familiarity with products, and trust 
based on similarity and familiarity of people with each other. Category 
(3) may include past decisions on institutional design and standards as 
basic as which side of the road to drive on or what type of electric plug 
design to adopt. 
We argue that the declining surplus trade of Habsburg countries after 
1989 is comparable to the dissolving trading capital described by HMR, 
but given the history of Central Europe relates only to that part of trading 
capital that was not isolated by the Iron Curtain, which are mainly the 
elements described in point (3). At the beginning of the century the 
Habsburg Monarchy was a politically and economically well integrated 
country. In the second half of the century it was split into two parts that 
were strictly separated for 44 years by the Iron Curtain. During the sepa-
ration, all formal institutions of the Empire ceased to exist as there were 
several waves of drastic institutional changes especially east of the Iron 
Curtain. Personal relationships were hard to maintain, and multinational 
firms connecting the East and West as well as other formal institutions 
were broken apart. Physical transport capital such as railway lines, pipe-
lines, and roads—already badly damaged in WWII—were deliberately 
destroyed, or left to deteriorate. At the same time institutions and norms 
converged within the East and within the West of the Iron Curtain into 
two distinct blocks. The historical circumstances thus offer a natural 
experiment setting in which we can observe some components of trading 
capital only between members of the former Habsburg Empire. In partic-
ular, any surplus trade observed after 1989 will overwhelmingly include 
those parts of trading capital that relate to point (3). Comparing these 
effects to HMR we find that these forces explain a quantitatively large 
part of trading capital, and that they deteriorate at a rate smaller than 
suggested for all trading capital by HMR.
We add direct evidence for this hypothesis in several ways. First, 
we show that this surplus trade appears for the Habsburg countries, but 
not for a number of placebo combinations between western and eastern 
countries in Europe. We also verify that our main finding, the declining 
surplus trade for Habsburg countries, is highly robust to alternative 
empirical strategies. When looking at the product level, we see the effect 
mainly for homogeneous rather than heterogeneous goods. We would 
expect this if countries follow a heuristic not based on economic rationale 
alone, since homogeneous goods make substitution less costly. We also 
see that the effect is stronger for those goods that were traded during the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Finally, we rule out a number of possible alternative 
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explanations. We present evidence that information, trust, and relation-
ships are most likely to explain the findings.
Our article adds to the literature showing that the degree to which such 
cultural forces influence trade seems to be large (e.g., Algan and Cahuc 
2010; Disdier and Mayer 2007; Michaels and Zhi 2010), linkages between 
countries are highly persistent once built up, and trade once interrupted 
takes a long time to recover (Felbermayr and Gröschl 2014; Nitsch and 
Wolf 2013). There have also been suggestions that culture matters more 
for trade than either institutions or borders (Becker, Boeckh, Hainz, et 
al. 2014). Our article also adds to a growing literature which empha-
sizes the long persistent effects of borders, institutions, and culture. For 
example, Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2009) estab-
lish the importance of trust and cultural similarity on economic exchange. 
Meanwhile, Peter Egger and Andrea Lassmann (2015) and Jacques Melitz 
and Farid Toubal (2014) document the importance of common languages. 
However, it is difficult to distinguish between cultural similarity and ease 
of communication. Cultural proximity is inherently difficult to measure. 
A number of recent studies have thus used proxy measures for cultural 
proximity such as voting behavior in the Eurovision Song Contest 
(Felbermayr and Toubal 2010) or the United Nations General Assembly 
(Dixon and Moon 1993). Alfred Lameli, Volker Nitsch, Jens Südekum, 
et al. (2015) show that the similarity of German dialects is an important 
predictor of trade within Germany. We add to this literature by providing 
an example and new measure of both the resilience of such historic and 
cultural effects on trade, as well as on its decline.
Our article’s methodology is related to Stephen Redding and Daniel 
Sturm (2008), who study the development of towns in West Germany 
and use the fall of the Iron Curtain as a natural experiment. Nitsch and 
Nikolaus Wolf (2013) document that it takes between 33 to 40 years to 
eliminate the impact of the Iron Curtain on trade within Germany. Our 
article mirrors Nitsch and Wolf (2013): While they show that borders 
remain visible in trade statistics long after they have been abolished, we 
demonstrate that borders take a long time to diminish trade when newly 
constructed. Simeon Djankov and Caroline Freund (2002) document that 
Russian regions continued to trade with each other more after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, which is broadly consistent with our findings. Other 
studies that use a similar setting to our article are Max Schulze and Wolf 
(2009) who examine trade within the Habsburg Monarchy in the late 
nineteenth century and find that borders that later emerge become visible 
in price data long before the collapse of the Empire. Rodney Thom and 
Brendan Walsh (2002) study the trade effect of Anglo-Irish monetary 
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dissolution and find little effect on trade. Sascha Becker et al. (2014) 
also present evidence on the importance of the Habsburg Empire on 
cultural norms. When comparing individuals living east and west of the 
long-gone Habsburg border, they find that people living on territory of 
the former Habsburg Monarchy have higher trust in courts and police. 
They argue that the former Empire had an enduring effect on people’s 
values through its decentralized, honest, and widely accepted state 
bureaucracy.
Trade is only one of many possible measures that could be influenced 
by historical legacies and cultural persistence. Migration and foreign 
direct investment might be others. Like HMR we choose to discuss this 
effect in terms of trade given that trade is recorded in a more consistent 
way and at a higher frequency than the other two measures. It is also 
less influenced by political decisions. For example, migration in Europe 
remained highly politically regulated until the European Union (EU) 
enlargement, and migration numbers are thus politically constrained. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In this article, we take the borders of the Habsburg Empire as they 
were just before the outbreak of WWI, displayed in Figure 1. While the 
Habsburg family had ruled the Empire for many centuries with changing 
borders, unification attempts and the introduction of a centralized admin-
istration came fairly late in the course of the eighteenth century.2 For our 
purposes, it is important that the Empire maintained a large, stable, and 
well integrated market with large internal trade flows throughout its last 
decades.
Although the Austro-Hungarian Empire had a large degree of ethnic and 
linguistic diversity, all parts of the Empire were linked by a common offi-
cial language, common legal institutions, and administration, as well as an 
expanding rail network. A strong emphasis on free trade strengthened the 
economic integration and trade flows within the country throughout the 
nineteenth century (Good 1984). The Empire possessed a fully integrated 
monetary union with full control maintained by the Austro-Hungarian 
Bank in Vienna. Fiscal policy of the Empire was run as a joint operation, 
2 In the thirteenth century Rudolf von Habsburg acquired the thrones of Austria and Styria, which 
his family held until the first half of the twentieth century. The Habsburg Monarchy expanded 
over the centuries mainly through skilful marriage policy, but also frequently lost territory in 
battle. The territory ruled by this family always incorporated different languages, customs, and 
religions, which especially in the early years were allowed to flourish locally. There was little 
superstructure until the reforms under Maria Theresia and Josef II, helped by chancellors Kaunitz 
and Metternich in the course of the eighteenth century.
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with separate budgets in Austria and Hungary contributing to the same 
common imperial expenditures and debt services (Eddie 1989). 
The Empire consisted of 53 million people, numbering 13 percent 
of the total European population and producing 10 percent of Europe’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Butschek 2012). As these figures imply, 
the economic condition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in its final 
decades prior to 1913 was poor in comparison to other European coun-
tries.3 Before the collapse of the Empire, some internal trade barriers 
became visible in price data at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
nationalism was on the rise long before the collapse (Schulze and Wolf 
2009, 2012). Yet these studies highlight that the Empire possessed a 
heavily integrated internal market at the beginning of the twentieth 
century regardless of these tendencies. The Empire further consisted 
of a well-functioning administration that unified the workings of many 
institutions across the regions it governed. The importance of the attach-
ment of people to the imperial administration and its government, and the 
political, economic, and cultural integration of its parts is highlighted by 
Figure 1
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE IN 1910 AND MODERN COUNTRY BOUNDARIES
Source: Habsburg map from Jeffreys (2007).
3 For example, Schulze (2010) documents poor performance in terms of GDP per capita growth 
for the Empire between 1870 and 1913, and even uses the term “great depression” to describe the 
situation in the western half of the Empire in 1873.
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Christopher Clark (2013, p. 71)4 and John Boyer (1989, p. 311)5 among 
other historians.
The end of WWI brought declarations of independence, which were 
sealed by the treaties of Saint Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920). New 
borders were drawn and new countries appeared, along lines of ethnicity, 
language, and trade networks. All the newly founded democracies on the 
territory of the former Empire now included large numbers of ethnic and 
linguistic minorities. The newly founded Republic of Austria was left 
with 23 percent of the population of the former Habsburg Monarchy. New 
borders followed a pattern of economic fragmentation that had emerged 
during the late nineteenth century (Wolf, Schulze, and Heinemeyer 
2011). Yet trade between countries of the former Empire remained high 
in the 1920s. Georges De Menil and Mathilde Maurel (1994) present 
evidence for strong trade in the years 1924–1926 among successor states 
of the former Empire, roughly of the magnitude of trade within the British 
Empire at that time. They explain the persistence of trade by pointing 
to common history, shared linguistic, and cultural ties, and mention the 
importance of business and personal relations as well as networks —all 
parts of trading capital. Institutional drift, however, had started. New and 
different currencies were introduced. For example, Hungary replaced the 
Austro-Hungarian korona with its own korona after independence only to 
replace it again by the pengo in 1925 and forint in 1946 following hyper-
inflation. The Austrian-Hungarian national railways were also split into 
multiple corporations, though traffic across the former Empire continued 
at a significant pace (De Menil and Maurel 1994).
World War II substantially disrupted trade, and it did not recover in 
the aftermath. Beginning in 1947, communist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe emerged under Soviet rule. The Sovietization of these 
economies caused a break in trade relations with the West, and foreign 
trade was organised as a strict state monopoly. Much of this remaining 
trade was arranged from Moscow, and negotiated at the highest political 
level, often as part of political bargains. An example for this was the 
4 “[The administration] was not an apparatus of repression, but a vibrant entity commanding 
strong attachments, a broker among manifold social, economic and cultural interests. [...] most 
inhabitants of the empire associated the Habsburg state with the benefits of orderly government: 
public education, welfare, sanitation, the rule of law and the maintenance of a sophisticated 
infrastructure.”
5 “ [...] competing popular and ethnic groups all had access to these public institutions [...] 
and these social groups quietly obtained some of their most sought after cultural attainments by 
means of these mechanisms, one might argue that the political and institutional history of the 
Empire presents [...] a state system that was not only more than the sum of its social parts, but 
was also psychologically consubstantial with those parts.”
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export of goods to the Soviet Union worth 6.6 billion Austrian schil-
lings in the aftermath of its independence in 1955 (Resch 2010). Agnes 
Pogany (2010, p. 147) writes on the relationship between Austria and 
Hungary: “Economic ties [...] became insignificant in the years following 
World War II. Centuries-old relations were reduced to a minimal level 
[...].” While Moscow took control of trade in the eastern countries, on 
the western side trade was also heavily politically influenced. The main 
driver of this was the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM), established in 1949, an institution to organise 
embargoes against Soviet countries. Austria did not formally become a 
COCOM member, but its eastern trade was influenced heavily by it under 
the obligations coming with Marshall aid (Resch 2010). Economic coop-
eration was politically motivated and largely symbolic.
Large parts of infrastructure, especially the railways, were destroyed 
during the war and they would only partially be rebuilt taking into account 
the post war borders. An anecdote might highlight the poor recovery 
of infrastructure: The two capitals closest to each other in Europe are 
Vienna and Bratislava, at a distance of less than 60 kilometers. During 
the time of the Empire there was a tramway that connected both cities, 
the “Pressburger Bahn.” There has been no similar connection during the 
post war period and today the time to travel from one city to the other is 
larger than it was in 1900.6
The Iron Curtain was an ideological boundary, but also primarily 
a geographical border. The most substantial cut to trade relations was 
brought about by the erection of the physical Iron Curtain, whose 
construction begun in 1949. The new border ran right through the former 
Habsburg countries, splitting Austria and the formerly Austrian parts of 
Italy from the rest. After the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 the already 
very limited possibility of transit ceased and all activity crossing this 
border was further suppressed. The border was sealed by barbed wire, 
land mines, high voltage fences, self shot systems, and other means. Only 
few people with special permissions were allowed close to the border. As 
such the Iron Curtain thus presented a completely sealed border that cut 
off all former local economic activity between the two sides (Redding 
and Sturm 2008). 
Furthermore, the economies of Hungary and Czechoslovakia switched 
to central planning. Multinational companies were split, personal inter-
action and communication over the border became increasingly difficult 
6 In the discussion of the results we provide further examples of abandoned infrastructure 
between East and West.
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and rare. Table 1 shows the development of imports and exports from 
Austria to former Habsburg countries, and Germany.7 The table shows a 
large decline of both imports and exports between Austria and the other 
former Habsburg countries after 1920 and again after 1946. For example, 
Austrian imports from Czechoslovakia fell from 37.6 percent in 1920 
to 2 percent in 1960. Austrian exports to Czechoslovakia fell from 24.8 
percent in 1920 to 2.6 percent in 1960. As apparent from Table 1, Austrian 
trade with Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia equally shows 
this decline. Austrian trade was directed instead towards western trading 
partners, as demonstrated the opposing trend of exports and imports to 
and from Germany.
The relationships of the West with Yugoslavia were different from those 
with Hungary and Czechoslovakia because Yugoslavia—despite being 
socialist and autocratic—maintained looser ties with Moscow (Lazarevic 
2010). This allowed the United States to contribute to aid programs from 
1952. Eventually this even led to the accession of Yugoslavia to GATT 
(the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1966. Yugoslavia main-
tained sizeable trade relationships with the West, which in some years 
even exceeded its trade levels with the Comecon countries. Its main 
trade partners in the West between 1955 and 1986 were members of 
the European Economic Area (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, West Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland). For 
example, in 1986 Yugoslav exports to the EEA countries were more than 
7 times as large as exports to EFTA (Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
and Switzerland) (Lazarevic 2010), which suggests that trade between 
Yugoslavia and Austria was not particularly developed during the Cold 
War.
We mention only two properties of the fall of the Iron Curtain which 
are important here, namely that it happened fast and that it was noted by 
almost everyone on either side of the border with surprise (Redding and 
Sturm 2008).
These large changes of the map of Central Europe in the course of the 
twentieth century are displayed in Figure 1. The map displays modern 
country boundaries and a map of the Habsburg Empire in 1910. Table 
2 shows the percentage of modern territory that was part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire for modern countries. Most of the countries that were 
part of the Empire are in the east, by which we indicate countries that 
were on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, to which we also add the 
countries of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
7 The numbers are from Butschek (2012, tables 75 and 76).
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taBle 2
HABSBURG MEMBERS
Country 
Share of Land  
That Was Habsburg East 
Year of EU  
Accession
Year of Euro 
Adoption
Austria 1  1995 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 1   
Croatia 1 1 2013  
Czech Republic 1 1 2004  
Hungary 1 1 2004  
Italy 0.05  1952 1999
Poland 0.12 1 2004  
Romania 0.44 1 2007  
Serbia 0.25 1   
Slovakia 1 1 2004 2009
Slovenia 1 1 2004 2007
Ukraine 0.12 1   
Notes: Share of land that was Habsburg denotes the share of the area of the modern country that 
was part of the Habsburg Monarchy in the year 1910. The Habsburg dummy consists of countries 
with values of 1 in Column 1. Missing values in the last two columns indicate no membership in 
2013. 
Source: Author calculation (Share of land), Encyclopaedia Britannica (rest).
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia as well as parts of Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, and the Ukraine. On the western side of the Iron Curtain 
are Austria and South Tyrol, which is now part of Italy.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
To investigate persistence of Austrian trade with countries east of 
the Curtain (Austria-East), a variable indicating a trade flow between 
Austria and a country east of the Iron Curtain, and members of the former 
Habsburg Monarchy after decades of Cold War, we largely follow the 
methodology used by HMR. They develop a method to address a closely 
related question, and the similarity allows us to compare our estimates to 
theirs. We estimate gravity equations, to which we add (Austria x East) 
x year and Habsburg x times x year dummy variables, which are our 
principal variables of interest. We run the estimations once jointly with 
Austria-East and Habsburg dummies, and once separately only including 
one set of dummies interacted with year. We use the boundaries of the 
Habsburg Empire in its last days. The gravity framework captures the 
counterfactual multinational trade had there been no Habsburg relation-
ship. The (Austria x East) x year and Habsburg x year indicators capture 
any trade in excess of what the gravity model alone would predict. 
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The well-known empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity 
equation can be represented in the following form, in the notation of 
HMR:
Xint = C
ex
it C
im
nt φint,  (1)
where Xint denotes importer ns total expenditure on imports from origin i 
in year t, Cexit, and C
im
nt are origin and destination attributes in a specific 
year, and φint measures bilateral effects on trade. Since there is no set of 
parameters for which equation (1) will hold exactly, the conventional 
approach is to add a stochastic term and estimate after log-linearizing. 
Head and Mayer (2013) or Egger (2000) provide overviews of this tech-
nique including a number of theoretical foundations which yield gravity 
equations. In particular, we estimate equation
ln(Xint) = μit + μnt + γ Dint + δ
(Aus x East) (Aus x East)int (2)
+ δ Hint + δ
east Hint
east + εint, 
where μit and μnt denote origin x year and destination x year fixed effects, 
respectively, and δ coefficients to be estimated. The inclusion of sets of 
fixed effects interacted with year makes separate time fixed effects redun-
dant. Matrix Dint denotes pairwise covariates that may be time varying or 
not. In an effort to distil the main effect of interest as precisely as possible, 
we include as detailed fixed effects as possible. In particular, we include 
the variables shared border, common official and spoken language, and 
common legal institutions as time varying dummy variables to flexibly 
account for the many possible changes in the cultural and political climate 
in Europe during this period. These sets of control variables make it 
redundant to control for the standard right-hand side variables measuring 
the size of countries, such as population and income, and allow only to 
include bilateral variables that vary over time. We include bilateral indi-
cators for the distance between both countries, indicators for a shared 
border, an officially joint language, a joint spoken language, common 
legal institutions, common religion, common currency, the presence of a 
regional trade agreement as well as indicators if both are members of the 
EU, the Euro zone, or on the east of the Iron Curtain. All these standard 
bilateral control variables are taken from the standard source for this type 
of estimation, and precise definitions are given there (Mayer and Zignago 
2011). A brief description of these measures is in the Online Appendix A 
(Beestermöller and Rauch 2017).
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The main variables of interest are the bilateral coefficients on the inter-
action term (Aus x East)int, dummies indicating if the observed flow is 
between Austria and a country east of the former Iron Curtain, and Hint, 
which indicates if both countries were once part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy in year t. Since we are only interested in Habsburg trade that 
crosses the Iron Curtain, we also include a Hint
east variable, which captures 
all trade east of the Curtain (there is only Austria west of the Curtain in 
our baseline specification). Intuitively we estimate how the fraction of 
Austria-East and Habsburg surplus trade evolves over time. We use a 
comprehensive set of indicators to capture the different types of Habsburg 
trade. For our main variable we restrict our measure of Habsburg econo-
mies to only those which were fully part of the Habsburg Monarchy: 
Austria, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia. We argue that this is the 
safest approach, because including other economies which were only 
partly in the Empire, such as Italy, may pick up effects not specific to the 
Habsburg relationship. In the Online Appendix we show robustness to 
different choices of this Habsburg definition.
If we were to control for attributes of the exporter and importer using 
GDP per capita and populations our specification would suffer from bias 
caused by omission of “multilateral resistance” terms (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003). Multilateral resistance terms are functions of the entire set 
of φint from equation (1). We adopt the preferred method of the literature, 
which is to introduce exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects.8 This 
full fixed effects approach absorbs the exporting and importing specific 
effects (see Egger 2000). Exporter- and importer-year fixed effects do 
not work for unbalanced two-way panels (Baltagi 1995). If actual bilat-
eral data are not balanced, as is the case in HMR, one should use the 
least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach. However, this concern is 
not relevant to our aggregated European data set which is balanced.9 We 
therefore adopt the full fixed effects approach, even though this approach 
has the disadvantage that we cannot observe the coefficients of some of 
the right-hand side variables typically used in gravity models. 
We also address the issue of missing and zero trade observations. Zero 
and missing observations may be due to mistakes or reporting thresh-
olds, but bilateral trade can actually be zero. We treat all missing trade 
observations as zero trade. Our linear-in logs specification of equation 
(2) removes all observations of zero trade, thus introducing a potential 
8 See Feenstra (2004) who addresses different techniques to take care of multilateral resistance 
within the gravity framework.
9 Online Appendix A lists our data sources and discusses our approach to minimize data 
inaccuracies.
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selection bias. In the literature, it has been common to either drop the 
pairs with zero trade or estimate the model using Xint=1 for observations 
with Xint=0 as the dependent variable (see, e.g., Felbermayr and Kohler 
2006.) In our baseline specification we choose to drop the zero pairs, but 
also run a robustness check replacing zeros as ones. We also adopt the 
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique. A 
natural step would be to use Tobit which incorporates the zeros, but it 
assumes log normality and homoskedasticity on the error term, so we 
prefer PPML. The PPML incorporates zeros and parameters can be esti-
mated consistently with structural gravity as long as the data are consis-
tent, that is, provided the expectation of ε conditional on the covariates 
equals one (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). The estimation method is consis-
tent in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Thus, it provides a natural 
way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable. We believe this 
preferable to other estimators without further information on the hetero-
skedasticity. However, when large numbers of zeros are handled in this 
way, it may be severely biased. There are only 53 missing trade observa-
tions out of 13,200 observations in our data since we focus on estimating 
trade among European economies. The majority of missing trade values 
involve Albania as a trading partner for which trade may indeed be zero 
or so small that it falls below a minimum reporting threshold.
The estimation equation for the PPML estimator expresses equation 
(2) as
Xint = exp (μit + μnt + γ Dint + δ
(Aus x East) (Aus x East)int (3)
+ δ Hint + δ
east Hint
east) uint , 
where uint = exp(εint). 
Even though we include all the usual controls, our vector of bilateral 
variables may remain incomplete, so unobserved linkages end up in the 
error term. To capture possible omitted variables in εint, we estimate two 
additional econometric techniques: a lag dependent variable specifica-
tion and a specification with origin-destination (bilateral or dyad) fixed 
effects. The lagged dependent variable would absorb unobserved influ-
ences on trade that evolve gradually over time. Including a lagged depen-
dent variable biases coefficient estimates in short panel models.10 The 
time series dimension of our panel (T=22) is likely long enough such that 
biases can be safely considered second-order. Additionally, the lagged 
10 Nickell (1981) shows that the bias declines at rate 1/T.
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dependent variable technique will not deliver consistent estimates if there 
is a fixed component in the error term that is correlated with the control 
variables. We thus also run a specification with bilateral fixed effects. 
We can still obtain estimates of our coefficients of interest as our varia-
tion of interest is also varying over time (the Habsburg and Austria-East 
dummies are interacted by year). The bilateral fixed effects specification 
identifies the effect of Habsburg membership based on temporal (within-
bilateral) variation. In the bilateral fixed effects specification, all time 
invariant bilateral variables drop out.
To summarize, we estimate the Habsburg and Austria-East coefficients 
of interest using four different estimation techniques closely following 
HMR: simple ordinary least square (OLS), PPML, lag dependent vari-
able specification, and bilateral fixed effects (Dyad FE), each with a 
strong set of fixed effects. Our typical estimation has in excess of 13,000 
observations, and is robust to heteroskedasticity. We run these four esti-
mations on the joint set of Habsburg and Austria-East dummies and sepa-
rately with one set of dummies interacted with year. In the product level 
regressions we run the same specifications, but restrict the set of prod-
ucts for which we run the regression in various ways. For example, we 
analyze homogeneous and heterogeneous products separately to compare 
estimates.
The sources and details related to the construction of our dataset are 
documented in the Online Appendix A. All data we use and our treat-
ment of them is standard throughout the related literature. Here we just 
summarize a few decisions that we make. The dataset we use contains all 
European countries in the years from 1990 until 2011, the first year for 
which Comtrade data is available for all the countries of Europe after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the last year for which we found a complete set 
of data when we embarked on this project. We clean Comtrade data using 
the methodology of Robert Feenstra, Robert Lipsey, Haiyan Deng, et al. 
(2005). Trade data for the years before 1990 are available from sources 
other than Comtrade are not used given concerns about the compara-
bility of data. We use data for Europe only as we think that it provides a 
cleaner sample of countries for our proposed tests than the entire world. 
The first OLS assumption that the correct model is specified is easier to 
justify in a sample of more similar countries. We aggregate a few coun-
tries to maintain a balanced panel, see details of this in Table 1A in the 
Online Appendix. For the product regressions we use the well known 
BACI dataset from CEPII research centre, details described in the Online 
Appendix A. CEPII provided a BACI version that starts in 1992 for our 
countries, thus our product level analyses begin only in 1993 throughout.
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Before turning to the regression results, we present some descrip-
tive statistics which document the Habsburg trading surplus relative 
to Germany.11 Figure 2 considers trade of Germany and Austria with 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Czechoslovakia borders on both 
Germany (both East and West) and Austria, thus differences in distance 
seem negligible. Moreover, changes in multilateral resistance should also 
be fairly similar. The solid line shows the ratio of German to Austrian 
GDP (GDP Gt  /GDP At) over this period, which is the same in all three 
panels. The dashed line in the first panel shows the ratio of German trade 
with Czechoslovakia to Austrian trade with Czechoslovakia (XGer,Cze,t  /
XAus,Cze,t). If the Habsburg connection did not matter, we would expect 
the ratio of trade to mirror the ratio of GDP. However, we observe a 
large gap. In 1990 the German economy is roughly ten times as large as 
the Austrian economy. At the end of our sample period this ratio falls 
to about 8.5. However, trade with Czechoslovakia is three times larger 
for Germany and this ratio rises to just over 6 over the sample period. 
We also conduct the same exercise for Hungary and Poland. On the one 
hand, Hungary—yet another core Habsburg member—displays an even 
starker gap. The trade ratio rises from approximately 2 to 4.5. These 
graphs highlight that Austria’s trade with these two eastern countries was 
highly over-proportional given its size relative to Germany, but that this 
surplus steadily lowered over time. Even Poland, which we do not regard 
as a Habsburg member, since only 10 percent of its mass belonged to the 
Empire, and which does not share a border with Austria, exported less 
than ten times its Austrian exports to Germany in 1990. All the countries 
show the central empirical finding in this figure, a strong Austrian trade 
surplus that weakens over time. We now turn to a more rigorous explora-
tion of these suggested observations.
RESULTS
We run three sets of regressions. First, we restrict the sample to 
Habsburg countries. Second, we include Austria-East dummies to inves-
tigate surplus trade with all of the East. Third, we control for Austria-East 
and Habsburg jointly. We find that the effect for Austria-East becomes 
insignificant once we control for Habsburg. The first of these specifications 
11 We later use Germany as a placebo as it shares the language with Austria, and also directly 
borders many eastern countries. A risk of using that placebo might be that Germany could have 
also integrated faster with the East for its own particular history. However, as Nitsch and Wolf 
(2013, p. 154) observe, there was “remarkable persistence in intra-German trade patterns along 
the former East-West border.”
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is most important for our conclusion. We present it in detail and focus 
on the main elements of the other two.12 It is worth emphasizing that we 
use origin interacted with year fixed effects and destination times year 
fixed effects separately in all of these regressions. The Habsburg surplus 
trade coefficients are bilateral and vary annually by construction. Thus, 
they are not multicollinear with the inclusion of this strong set of control 
variables and fixed effects. 
In Table 3 we show the Habsburg x year coefficients, which we inter-
pret to be the surplus trade of Habsburg countries relative to what we 
would expect if trade followed our gravity model. These coefficients are 
also depicted in Figure 3. All four estimation methods display a steady 
decrease of the Habsburg surplus trade over time. We confirm that the 
first and last estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different 
to each other.13 The downward slope of the trend given in Figure 3 is 
strongly significant in all of the specifications, and the slope is remark-
ably similar. It shows a strongly statistically significant, monotonic 
decline with a slope of around –0.044. Thus the main results, namely that 
the cultural component of trading capital declines over time, is insensi-
tive to our estimation method. Note that the Habsburg trade bonus is 
large in the first year after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. For example, 
in the specification of Column (1) the additional trade in the year 1990 
is 0.69, which is about three times as large as the trade bonus from 
two countries having a regional trade agreement (0.24), two times as 
large as both countries having the same religion (0.34), and 1.6 times 
as large as both countries being located in Eastern Europe. This magni-
tude also corresponds to additional trade by a factor of e0.69, which is 
close to two. The surplus trade declines steadily and becomes statisti-
cally insignificant about ten years after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Note 
that the coefficients with Habsburg alone show stronger effects, smaller 
margins of error, and are more precisely estimated than the Austria-East 
coefficients.
Figure 4 displays the Austria-East by year interaction terms from an 
estimation with Austria-East coefficients. These results show a statisti-
cally significant effect in 1990 which declines linearly and monotonically 
in both OLS and PPML estimations. The other two techniques show no 
significant results. Once we add controls for the Habsburg x year coef-
ficients, this trend becomes insignificant in our preferred specification. 
12 Tables reporting coefficients of control variables and the exact Habsburg and Austria-East 
coefficients are omitted for length but available upon request.
13 F-test Probability > F values are OLS: .008; PPML: .001; Lag DV: .768; and Dyad FE: .000.
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taBle 3
ESTIMATION WITH HABSBURG-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS ONLY
Coefficients of Habsburg x year Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable:
OLS  
ln(xint)
PPML 
xint
Lag DV 
ln(xint)
Dyad FE 
ln(xint)
1990  0.687***  0.919***  —  0.854*** 
 (0.257)  (0.199)  —  (0.253) 
1991  0.613***  1.065***  0.00457  0.771*** 
 (0.227)  (0.151)  (0.113)  (0.220) 
1992  0.477**  0.885***  0.0131  0.609*** 
 (0.232)  (0.154)  (0.108)  (0.206) 
1993  0.514**  0.732***  0.150  0.612*** 
 (0.210)  (0.143)  (0.116)  (0.160) 
1994  0.351  0.784***  –0.149*  0.459*** 
 (0.219)  (0.136)  (0.0812)  (0.158) 
1995  0.367*  0.783***  0.00948  0.501*** 
 (0.216)  (0.164)  (0.0804)  (0.149) 
1996  0.498***  0.750***  0.171*  0.639*** 
 (0.192)  (0.105)  (0.0997)  (0.153) 
1997  0.506**  0.795***  0.0584  0.650*** 
 (0.203)  (0.114)  (0.0921)  (0.153) 
1998  0.363*  0.634***  –0.0761  0.509*** 
 (0.215)  (0.122)  (0.0740)  (0.132) 
1999  0.212  0.521***  –0.0477  0.412*** 
 (0.212)  (0.135)  (0.0831)  (0.136) 
2000  0.205  0.531***  0.00470  0.392*** 
 (0.199)  (0.110)  (0.0690)  (0.136) 
2001  0.134  0.485***  –0.0399  0.316** 
 (0.204)  (0.112)  (0.0712)  (0.142) 
2002  0.0599  0.388***  –0.0714  0.242 
 (0.194)  (0.113)  (0.0805)  (0.149) 
2003  –0.0428  0.334***  –0.110  0.137 
 (0.199)  (0.114)  (0.0675)  (0.155) 
2004  0.112  0.405***  0.123  0.294** 
 (0.209)  (0.132)  (0.0969)  (0.147) 
2005  –0.0520  0.265*  –0.151**  0.131 
 (0.211)  (0.157)  (0.0712)  (0.160) 
2006  –0.111  0.176  –0.102*  0.0691 
 (0.208)  (0.123)  (0.0617)  (0.146) 
2007  –0.209  0.203  –0.154**  –0.0448 
 (0.210)  (0.131)  (0.0786)  (0.149) 
2008  –0.159  0.271**  –0.000727  0.00778 
 (0.202)  (0.115)  (0.0614)  (0.145) 
2009  –0.215  0.177  –0.109  –0.0509 
 (0.230)  (0.128)  (0.0895)  (0.161) 
2010  –0.179  0.201*  –0.0225  –0.0150 
 (0.216)  (0.122)  (0.0702)  (0.163) 
2011  –0.167  0.206*  –0.0325  —
 (0.196)  (0.115)  (0.0554)  —
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Notes: This table and Table 4 display different coefficients from the same regressions. Columns 1, 2, and 4 provide 
estimates of equation (2), Column 2 from equation (3). Coefficients are depicted in Figure 3. Robust standard errors 
used.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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A weak downward slope remains only in the PPML specification, 
statistically insignificant from zero, see Figure 5. These graphs suggest 
that Austria-East does not play a pronounced role once we control for 
Habsburg membership. 
In Table 4 we proceed to estimate equations (2) and (3) from earlier 
with only coefficients for Habsburg membership. As expected, distance 
negatively impacts trade in all specifications where we can include this 
control variable. The displayed time varying dyadic effects tend to show 
the expected sign, but coefficients vary across specifications. The latter 
is expected, as these specifications differ in many respects, for example, 
the PPML code is written to be estimated using levels rather than natural 
logarithms on the left-hand side variable. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) also 
find a significantly smaller effect of geographical distance. Some of the 
coefficients show unexpected signs, such as negative coefficients for 
common currency and “Both EU.” This might reflect that some wealthy 
economies such as Norway and Switzerland are not part of EU and 
Eurozone. The PPML coefficient of distance exactly corresponds to that 
of HMR. 
One concern might be that the opening of the trade relations between 
the East and West might be dynamic, increasing or decreasing, in the 
first years after the opening of the Iron Curtain for reasons other than 
the decline of historic and cultural ties. For example, the installation or 
reuse of transport infrastructure might suggest a dynamic trade relation-
ship between an eastern and a western country, or the slow establishment 
of personal exchange and interaction. In both these examples we would 
expect an increasing relationship, but there may be others. To mitigate 
concerns that such effects drive our results we run a placebo exercise 
in which we estimate “Habsburg” effects on a relationship other than 
Habsburg, for which we do not expect the same decay of cultural ties. We 
choose Germany as the placebo country, which shares the language with 
Austria, and also a direct border with many eastern countries. When we 
estimate the trading relationship with Germany instead of Austria being 
the “Habsburg” country west of the curtain, we do not find significant 
relationships. These results are reported in the Online Appendix B, and 
in this table we use the same specification as applied in Tables 3 and 4. 
We also report results for similar placebo exercises using Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Italy as alternative placebo 
countries, and we find no strong trend for either of these countries, with 
the exception of a moderate decrease in Italy, which was partly Habsburg. 
We interpret this finding to cast doubt on the relevance of other dynamic 
effects shaping initial trade relationships.
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taBle 4
ESTIMATION WITH HABSBURG-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS ONLY
Coefficients of Control Variables
Dependent Variable:
(1) 
OLS 
ln(xint)
(2) 
PPML 
xint
(3) 
Lag DV 
ln(xint)
(4) 
Bilateral FE 
ln(xint)
Variable of interest:
Habsburg - year fixed effects Coefficients are reported in Table 3 and Figure 3
Time fixed dyadic effects:
Log distance –1.181*** –0.641*** –0.213***
(0.0239) (0.0113) (0.0215)
Common religion 0.344*** 0.108*** 0.0614***
(0.0336) (0.108) (0.0162)
Both East 0.419*** 0.116*** –0.0358
(0.0491) (0.0455) (0.0304)
Shared border - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Official common language - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common language spoken - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common legal institutions - year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying dyadic effects:
Common currency –0.197*** 0.00541 –0.00482 –0.0192
(0.0358) (0.0339) (0.0188) (0.0307)
Regional trade agreement 0.237*** 0.288*** 0.0576 0.344***
(0.0560) (0.0531) (0.0411) (0.0570)
Both EU –0.0119 –0.108*** 0.0175 –0.00553
(0.0396) (0.0319) (0.0198) (0.0222)
Both Euro –0.0862*** 0.271*** –0.0451*** –0.0302
(0.0280) (0.0311) (0.0157) (0.0363)
Lagged exports 0.831***
(0.0126)
Origin country - year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination country - year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral fixed effects No No No Yes
Habsburg - east - year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,147 13,200 12,518 13,147
R-squared 0.937 0.966 0.982 0.976
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Notes: This table and Table 3 display different coefficients from the same regressions. Columns 1, 2, and 
4 provide estimates of equation (2), Column 2 from equation (3). Table 3 shows the Habsburg x year 
coefficients. Robust standard errors used.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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In the Online Appendix we demonstrate robustness of these results 
for different estimation strategies, additional control variables, different 
choices for the Habsburg definition, aggregation of countries, how to deal 
with missing and zero data, adding internal trade flows, and different 
treatment of standard errors. We find generally that this main trend is 
strongly robust to modifications of this type.
PRODUCT LEVEL RESULTS
In this section we shed more light on the mechanism driving our main 
result by studying various product categories separately. In Figure 6 we 
report the main OLS specification for each of the two-digit HS (harmo-
nized system) product codes except for services for which no BACI data 
are available. In 13 of the 15 plots the trend is downward sloping, and in 
10 the downward trend is significant at the 5 percent level. The graph is 
upward sloping for animal products and skins and leather, both of which 
are small industries, accounting for 0.7 and 0.6 percent of all exports in 
Europe in 2000, respectively. This graph shows that our main results of 
a strong initial Habsburg surplus that weakens over time is not driven by 
a few industries, but is observable for most industry groups individually, 
to a varying degree. The strongest effects in magnitude are found for 
machinery, foodstuff, and miscellaneous. The general trend within most 
groups implies that industry composition changes alone cannot account 
for the observation of the effect.
If our results are driven by an instinct of going back to where things 
had been before the wars, we might expect some correlation across indus-
tries from the Empire to trade in the 1990s. We next run our main regres-
sion separately for products traded predominantly in the Empire and 
other products. Given changing boundaries, and changes in the product 
space this can only be done on a broad level, and remains an exercise 
with noise. Scott Eddie (1989) characterises the Habsburg Monarchy 
as a marriage of wheat and textiles. David Good (1984) lists the main 
traded items in the Empire from 1884 to 1913 from Hungary as food and 
beverages, crops, sugar, flourcrops, sugar and flour. From Austria they 
were industrial raw materials, textiles, machinery, and manufactured 
products. Following these classifications we classify the industries food-
stuff, machinery, and textiles as main industries traded in the Empire. We 
find that both product classes show a significant, monotonic downward 
slope, which is not surprising given that we find the downward slope for 
most individual HS2 product categories. The initial trade bonus for the 
Habsburg traded goods is almost double that for the others, and the slope 
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in the plot showing the Habsburg traded goods is also 2.8 times larger. 
The trade surplus becomes insignificant in both cases in the 2000s.
We study the effect by heterogeneous and homogeneous products, 
following the standard classification by James Rauch (1999). We merge 
the classification at the level of HS4, keeping only matched trade flows. 
These are 15 percent of total trade flows. We think that the Habsburg 
bonus disappears over time as Europe adjusts to the new trading envi-
ronment, and converges to the new optimum. This suggests that initial 
deviations from the optimum, which here happen to coincide with the 
gravity framework, were not the first best choice. We would expect to 
find that the Habsburg bonuses are thus stronger for homogeneous goods, 
for which search costs and the costs of not using the optimum product 
are smaller, and thus the temptation to follow an intuitive heuristic when 
buying greater. As can be seen in the top panels of Figure 7A in the 
Online Appendix, indeed we find the bonus is stronger initially, and falls 
more rapidly for the homogeneous goods, while there is not such a clear 
pattern for the differentiated products. 
If transport infrastructure surviving from the Empire was an important 
driver of our findings, we should expect to see a stronger effect for goods 
easier to transport. To measure this effect we obtain data on unit values 
from the CEPII TUV dataset.14 This dataset gives Free on Board (FoB) 
unit values per ton for each HS6 product. If, in line with the literature, 
we assume that the costs to ship a ton of any good are fairly similar, then 
inverse unit value data can serve as a proxy for transport costs, as the 
ratio of transport costs per value transported would be smaller. Using 
this proxy we compare above and below median goods separately, in 
the bottom two panels of Figure 7A in the Online Appendix. The panel 
of “costly” goods refers to above median transport cost goods, while 
“cheap” refers to below median ones. The standard pattern emerges, and 
the initial surplus trade is similar in both specifications. If there was a 
difference, it would be that the goods that are harder to transport adjust 
earlier. An explanation for this earlier drop may be that for these goods 
the costs of a suboptimal country to import from are higher, so adjust-
ment may be quicker. In any case, this difference is not very strong, and 
coefficients rest firmly within the confidence intervals of the other graph.
DISCUSSION
We consider a number of possible explanations why the countries of 
the Empire trade more with each other in the first years after the collapse 
14 Downloaded from www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en in September 2014.
Trade in the Aftermath of the Fall of the Iron Curtain 385
of the Iron Curtain, and why this initial trade bonus declines over time. 
First we rule out a number of explanations we consider less likely, before 
presenting explanations we find more plausible.
Less Plausible Explanations
First, this result might just be a consequence of a miss-specification of 
the gravity equation. A highly structural approach of the kind we employ 
is easily prone to introduce noise when looking at specific bilateral trade 
volumes. If, for example, we overestimate the distance between Austria 
and the eastern countries, the residuals for these bilateral observations 
in a standard gravity model would be positive.15 Or there might be some 
natural geographic advantage that facilitates trade between these coun-
tries, and this reason might have brought about both the Empire before 
1918 and the surplus trade after 1989. Explanations and examples of this 
type could cast doubt on the existence of a static Habsburg surplus trade. 
What we observe is a trade bonus that declines linearly and monotoni-
cally over time, and it does so robustly across a number of very different 
estimation methods. This dynamic result is hard to explain as a simple 
statistical property of miss-specification or measurement error. If it 
was a purely mechanical specification error, our placebo exercise, that 
replaces Austria with Germany, would be prone to suffer from the same 
problem, and show the same downward slope. We verify that our main 
specification is robust to the use of different measures of distance, such 
as the distance between the most populated city, and two measures of 
weighted distances. Our numerous robustness checks which vary estima-
tion strategy, aggregation of countries, and control variables should also 
help to address this concern.
Second, this surplus trade may stem from better existing transport 
infrastructure dating back to the times of the Empire. However, most 
of this infrastructure was unused during the Cold War and by 1989 
was derelict. The main rail lines connecting Austria with the East were 
abandoned; for example, in 1945 the track connecting Bratislava and 
Vienna, the Pressburger Bahn, the rail to the Czech Republic via Laa 
an der Thaya and the connection via Fratres-Slavonice were abandoned. 
All these lines have only just been revived. Transcontinental connec-
tions such as Vienna-Hamburg or Vienna-Berlin have switched perma-
nently to run via Passau instead of Prague. There is also evidence that 
15 Given the location of Vienna in the east of Austria we actually underestimate the distance 
relative to the harmonic mean suggested in Rauch (2016).
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reconstruction and construction of new networks was slow after 1990 
in countries east of the border (Erdösi 1999). Further, even if a derelict 
rail line provides a strong advantage to trade, we would not expect this 
surplus to contribute immediately given the time it takes to renovate such 
a network. Thus we would expect a rise of the Habsburg bonus in the 
first years, as infrastructure is slowly brought back to full capacity. In the 
product level section we do not find a big difference between products 
that are cheap or expensive to transport, which should also address this 
concern.
Third, this trade bonus might just reflect the specific history of bilat-
eral developments after 1989 that are unconnected to prior history. 
Austria might have had a starting advantage, after all it was between 
Austria and Hungary that the Iron Curtain first opened. While it is true 
that the Iron Curtain was symbolically opened first between Austria and 
Hungary, things moved rapidly after that. The first symbolic opening 
on 19 August 1989 was less than three months before the opening of 
borders within Germany on 9 November. The first time Germans could 
flee was on 10 and 11 September. Most of the people who fled in the 
two months before the broader opening were East Germans. Thus, the 
head start was neither long, nor specifically beneficial to the Austrian 
economy.
Fourth, it may be that language barriers have initially favored trade 
from Austria to the East, given that a higher fraction of citizens in the 
eastern countries still speak German than in other European countries. 
This explanation is similar to the interpretation we favour, however, 
the placebo exercise using Germany and Switzerland suggest that the 
German language cannot explain this surplus trade, and in fact does not 
seem to contribute to its decline.
Fifth, political factors such as Austria’s neutrality may have helped to 
win the trust of eastern trading partners. This, however, should predict 
a general increase in trade for Austria with all eastern countries, rather 
than the selected members of the former Empire, and would be absorbed 
by the interactions of Austria with all of Eastern Europe that we include. 
Further, we would not expect this or similar effects to decline over time as 
Austria’s political neutrality persists.16 The placebo exercise using neutral 
Switzerland may also help to address this concern. As Felix Butschek 
(2012) notes, the Austrian government contributed little to build friendly 
relationships with its eastern neighbors in the first years after 1990.
16 Despite joining the EU and the Euro, neutrality remains an important part of the Austrian 
political identity, and is a core element of its constitution and political identity.
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More Plausible Explanations
Butschek’s economic history of Austria (2012) discusses the relation-
ship between Austria and the former Habsburg countries in the East in the 
twentieth century. He describes the trade patterns studied in this article: 
strong economic ties during the Empire, the strong trade links in the inter-
war period, drastic stagnation of trade in the period of the Iron Curtain, a 
trade boom in the 1990s. He names Austria the greatest western benefi-
ciary from the economic expansion towards the East. Butschek explicitly 
states that historic factors likely explain the trade surplus after 1990. He 
also notes geographic proximity, and suggests that Austria may have an 
informational advantage over other western countries. He points out that 
the trade boom happened without help from the Austrian government, 
in fact the Austrian government slowed it through aggressive diplomacy 
towards the East in the 1990s.17
Butschek’s (2012, p. 405) key explanation for the surplus trade is that: 
“Austrian managers seem to have been more familiar with the situation in 
the successor states than their colleagues from other countries.”18 Here, we 
translate the original verb “vertraut sein” as “familiar with.” However, its 
German form offers a wider meaning: “vertrauen” also means “to trust,” 
and when used as a noun is the German word for “Trust.” In using this 
verb, Butschek suggests two main positive explanations we share for the 
surplus trade: trust and information.
First, there is some evidence that cultural proximity of the past leads 
to greater trust, better communication, and thus lower fixed costs of 
exporting for Austria. Emile Durkheim (1912) is associated with the 
idea that memory can be social and inter-generational.19 Historic legacy 
may lead to easier communication, greater trust, more similar prefer-
ences, and thus lower trade costs. In Hungary the Habsburg legacy was 
celebrated during communism, with ample space given to it in the history 
school books. Also in the West, Solomon Wank (1997, p. 132) describes a 
consensus view of historians of the 1990s that was nostalgic of Habsburg 
and run the risk of “distorting historical reality [...] by emphasizing the 
Empire’s positive qualities [...].” Furthermore, historians of the time also 
implied that “some substitute for Austria-Hungary in Central Europe must 
17 In this context, Butschek (2012, p. 407) mentions attacks by the Austrian government against 
neighboring nuclear power plants and lack of investment in much needed roads to connect Austria 
with the East.
18 Original German: “Die österreischischen Unternehmer schienen mit der Situation in den 
Nachfolgestaaten besser vertraut als ihre Kollegen in anderen Ländern.”
19 Jacobs (2010) gives examples of such inter-generational memory in the context of the 
holocaust.
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be created” and “there is a legacy of positive lessons that the Habsburg 
Empire has bequeathed to Europe.” Maximilian Hartmuth (2011) writes 
that the Empire was not remembered as a “prison of nations” any longer, 
but a multicultural empire. Dualism is described as the golden period in 
Hungarian history. In the 1980s the Austrian Sisi movies, about the life 
of the Empress, were shown on national Hungarian television, leading 
to a celebration of her among Hungarian teenagers. Similarly, Emperor 
Franz Josef enjoys great popularity in Hungary to this day, and did so all 
throughout communism. An episode that illustrates this celebration of 
Habsburg was the return of the Holy Crown of Hungary, last worn by a 
Habsburg, in 1978, as a gift from then President Jimmy Carter. This gift, a 
reminder of Hungary’s monarchic past, was welcomed so enthusiastically 
by the Hungarian people that the Communist government went along with it.
Conversely the reputation of the Germans, based on memories of the 
wars, was less favourable. Witnesses who were engaged with foreign 
investors in the early 1990s from both sides of the Iron Curtain told us that 
Austrian investors in the 1990s in the East were seen as culturally closer 
than German investors. The eastern province of Austria, Burgenland, 
was handed to Austria from Hungary in the 1920s. This too could have 
greatly helped communication two generations later. As more quanti-
tative evidence, we observe cultural proximity between the Habsburg 
countries elsewhere, such as a positive bias in the Eurovision voting 
behavior.20 This type of explanation accounts for the fact that the trade 
surplus we describe is visible for trade of the former Habsburg countries, 
and not visible for trade between Austria and other eastern countries.
Second, Austrians may have had better information and better contacts. 
Centrally planned economies of the East did not turn into free markets 
immediately, and for quite some time central planners may have greatly 
influenced business decisions well into the 1990s. While Austrian trade 
with the East was at low levels, as described earlier, these volumes may 
have been sufficient to maintain contacts with central decision makers. 
Austria had a couple of these informational advantages over other western 
countries. In exchange for Austria’s independence, Moscow received 
resources. Pogany (2010) suggests that the smooth and punctual delivery 
of these goods gave Austria a good reputation as business partner of 
eastern decision makers. The occupation of the eastern parts of Austria 
20 In the Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) data available from Toubal’s website we compute the 
mean Eurovision score given from country i to j and from j to i for each year and country pair. We 
define Habsburg as the countries in their dataset that we count as part of the Empire in our main 
measure. Conditional on time fixed effects these Habsburg countries have a score that is 0.048 
higher than the mean of the sample, a difference that is significant at the 5 percent level.
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by the Soviets until 1955 gave it direct exposure to eastern structures and 
decision processes. Following independence, diplomatic and cultural ties 
were stronger than those of other western countries. Austria was allowed to 
maintain cultural centres in the East, and cultural and scientific exchanges 
between Austria and the East were easier. While still at low levels, this 
may have been enough to generate a significant advantage in 1990. 
Cultural and historical memory as well as information advantages 
may, of course, jointly have influenced trade, and reinforced one another. 
Austria’s exposure to the planned economies of the East may have 
contributed to establish trust. Conversely, the joint history may have 
helped to maintain contacts during the Iron Curtain division and estab-
lish new contacts after 1990. Initial trust and communication advantages 
slowly fade out as the Habsburg countries integrate in the new geopo-
litical reality during the 1990s. Equal, initial advantages from superior 
contacts can help to win a head-start in the first years, but will give less 
and less advantage in the dynamic economy in the medium run. Thus, 
both explanations can be plausibly reconciled with our empirical finding: 
With the initial trust and communication advantage disappearing, Europe 
converged towards the trade quantities predicted by the gravity model 
and the Habsburg surplus trade disappeared.
Magnitudes
To compare these magnitudes to HMR we conduct a few simple 
calculations using our estimates. HMR use an OLS specification, which 
they obtain by exponentiating the surplus trade effect and subtracting 
one. They find that on average trade remains 31 percent higher after 60 
years. Using this same methodology and the numbers provided in their 
article, this implies that colonial relationships lead to a trade boost of 
350 percent in the year of colonial break up. We can use our estimates 
directly to produce equivalent estimates. Following Column (1) in Table 
3 our corresponding numbers are surplus trade of 69 percent in year zero 
and 21 percent in year 10. We assume for mathematical convenience and 
sake of simplicity that the decay is linear. This assumption is consistent 
with the graphs provided by HMR, and by our own Figure 3 and implies 
a negative slope of 5.3 for the decay of trading capital, and 4.8 for the 
decay of the cultural part of it.21 We can conclude that the decay of the 
21 As an additional robustness check, we repeat our analysis including a year trend and Habsburg 
x year interaction term. This is a more parametric analysis compared to our main specification as 
it forces the slope to be linear. We find a statistically significant negative slope on the interaction 
term in all specifications.
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cultural component of trading capital is 10 percent slower than the decay 
of all trading capital. This comparison does not require us to specify the 
start year of the decay.
Remarks on the estimated share of the stock of trading capital that is 
cultural are less precise, as we do not know which year we should use as 
the equivalent year for colonial break up of the Habsburg Monarchy. The 
year 1989 did not mark the end of the colonial relationship. In fact, we 
do not know the end we should use in our example, as we do not know if 
the heavy involvement of the Soviets in the East sped up cultural memory 
loss, or froze it compared to a situation in the free market. Our analysis 
of trade flows before 1990, provided in the Online Appendix does not 
suggest a decline before 1990. We can estimate the year in which the 
stock of cultural trading capital is exhausted, which is when the curves in 
Figure 3 become zero, around 2010. If we assume that the Soviet Union 
worked as a freezer of cultural capital and count the years 1918–1945 
and 1990–2010 as years of decay we end up with an expected boost of 
225.6 percent in year zero, compared to 350 percent implied in HMR, 
which would amount to 65 percent. Assuming that after the Iron Curtain 
fell people looked to the year before the wars and communism and that 
the decay was only for 20 years (1990–2010) we estimate the historical 
and cultural component. It amounts to 27 percent of trading capital, if we 
normalize the start year such that trading capital and its cultural compo-
nent become zero at the same point in time, we estimate four-fifths. We 
include this exercise as a natural comparison, but of course, it is rather 
crude.
CONCLUSION
The countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy trade substan-
tially more after the fall of the Iron Curtain than a standard gravity model 
would predict. This initial Habsburg surplus trade is large, about four 
times the effect of a currency union. It deteriorates rapidly, in a monotonic 
and linear way, and disappears within one or two decades. This effect is 
specific to the former Habsburg countries, and not found for either trade 
with Austria and other countries in the East, or Eastern Habsburg coun-
tries and trade with Germany, Switzerland, or the Netherlands.
We suggest that the most likely explanation is that the trade advan-
tage comes from a mixture of increased trust, better communication, 
and better information given the history between Austria and its eastern 
neighbors, both before the wars and during isolation. Recently Head and 
Mayer (2013) write that a legacy of historical isolation and conflict forged 
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a world economy in which neither tastes nor information are homoge-
neously distributed. Cultural difference and inadequate information mani-
fest themselves at national borders, causing harm to trade. In this article we 
document and measure the great benefit of better information and cultural 
proximity for trade. We also measure the speed of convergence of coun-
tries that did not have these starting advantages. Thus, this article informs 
both the static and dynamic benefits of good relationships on trade.
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